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Abstract. In [5] we build a formal verification technique for game based
correctness proofs of cryptograhic algorithms based on a probabilistic
Hoare style logic [10]. An important step towards enabling mechanized
verification within this technique is an axiomatization of implication be-
tween predicates which is purely semantically defined in [10]. In this
paper we provide an axiomatization and illustrate its place in the formal
verification technique of [5].
1 Introduction
A typical proof to show that a cryptographic construction is secure uses a reduc-
tion from the desired security notion towards some underlying hardness assump-
tion. The security notion is usually represented as a game, in which one proves
that the attacker’s chance of winning the game is negligible. From a program-
ming language perspective, these games can be thought of as programs whose
behaviour is partially known, since the program typically contains invocations
to an unknown function representing an arbitrary attacker. In this context, the
cryptographic reduction is a sequence of valid program transformations.
Even though cryptographic proofs based on game reductions are powerful,
the price one has to pay is high: these proofs are complex, and can easily become
involved and intricate. This makes the verification difficult, with subtle errors
difficult to spot. Some errors may remain uncovered long after publication, as
illustrated for example by Boneh and Franklin’s IBE encryption scheme [3],
whose cryptographic proof has been recently patched by Galindo [7].
Recently, several papers from the cryptographic community (e.g. the work of
Bellare and Rogaway [1], Halevi [8], and Shoup [13]) have recognized the need
to tame the complexity of cryptographic proofs. There, the need for (develop-
ment of) rigorous tools to organize cryptographic proofs in a systematic way
is advocated. Besides preventing subtle easily overlooked mistakes from being
introduced in the proof, this precise proof development framework would also
standardize the proof writing language so that proofs can be checked easily,
even perhaps using computer aided verification. The proposed frameworks [1, 8,
13] provide ad-hoc formalisms to reason about the sequences of games, providing
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useful program transformation rules and illustrating the techniques with several
cryptographic proofs from the literature.
In [5] we introduce a framework for game-based cryptographic proofs based
on Hoare logic [11] by adapting and extending earlier work on Probabilistic
Hoare-logic [10]. The use of the framework is illustrated with a formalized proof
of security of ElGamal [6], which reduces the semantic security of the cryp-
tosystem to the hardness of solving the (well-known) Decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem [2].
Here we address an important step towards the mechanizion of proofs in the
framework of [5]: axiomatization of the implication relation between predicates.
The Hoare style reasoning system deales with reasoning about programs, how-
ever, it assumes that a reasoning system for reasoning about the probabilistic
predicates is available. The main result of this paper is to provide this reasoning
system in the form of a calculus for implication and equivalence of predicates.
The core of the calculus, besides a conservative extension result allowing classical
logical reasoning, is formed by a list of axioms and a congruence result enabling
equational reasoning. Hence we also refer to the calculus as axiomatization of
the probabilistic predicate logic.
In the remainder of this paper we provide some basic definitions and in-
troduce the probabilistic logic, a probabilistic programming language and the
probabilistic Hoare style logic, recalling results from [10]. Next we introduce the
axiomatization of implication of predicates in an equational fashion. The role
of the axiomatization in proving correctness of cryptographic algorithms using
game based proofs is illustrated by using it in the correctness proof for El-Gamal
algorithm presented in [5]. We conclude with a discussion of the results and of
the further steps needed to obtain completely mechanized proofs.
2 The Basics
We shortly recall the logical predicates used by the probabilistic Hoare style
logic pL (see [10]). We introduce probabilistic states Θ and the validity relation
` for predicates which gives whether a predicate holds in a given probabilistic
state.
Expressions We define integer expressions e and Boolean expressions (or ‘con-
ditions’) c by:
e ::= n | x | e + e | e − e | e · e | e div e | e mod e | f(e, . . . , e)
c ::= true | false | b | e = e | e < e | c ∧ c | c ∨ c | ¬c | c→ c
where x is a variable of type (or ‘has range’) integer, b is a variable of type
Boolean and n a number. We assume it is clear how this can be extended with
additional operators and to other types and mostly leave the type of variables
implicit, assuming that all variables and values are of the correct type.
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Programs Probabilistic programs (or statements) s are defined by:
s ::= skip | x := e | s ; s | if c then s else s fi | D(e, . . . , e; x, . . . , x) | s⊕ρ s
where x is a program variable, e an expression of the right type, ; denotes
sequential composition, if conditional choice, D a procedure call and ⊕ρ prob-
abilistic choice. The procedure call D(e, e′; x, y) causes the body BD of D to be
executed with e, e′ as read only and x, y as read-write arguments. The read-write
arguments must be distinct variables (i.e. no aliasing). In s ⊕ρ s′ program s is
executed with probability ρ and s′ is executed with probability 1− ρ.
States A deterministic state, σ ∈ S, is a function that assigns a value to each
program variable. A probabilistic state, θ ∈ Θ gives the probability of being in
a given deterministic state. We can think of a probabilistic state as (countable)
set of labelled deterministic states or as a sum ρ1 · σ1 + ρ2 · σ2 + . . .. Here, the
probability of being in the (deterministic) state σi is ρi, i ≥ 0. The sum of all σi
is atmost 1. For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that each
state σ occurs at most once in θ; multiple occurrences of a single state can be
merged into one single occurrence by adding the probabilities, e.g. 1 · σ rather
than 34 · σ + 14 · σ.
Operations on states The value V(e)(σ) of an expression e in a state σ is defined
as usual. A variant σ[x/e] of a deterministic state σ is a state which only differs
from σ for the variable x where it returns V(e)(σ) the value of expression e (in
state σ). A variant θ[x/e] of a probabilistic state θ is obtained by taking the
variant element wise, i.e. if θ = ρ1 · σ1 + ρ2 · σ2 + . . . then θ[x/e] = ρ1 · σ1[x/e] +
ρ2 · σ2[x/e] + . . ..
The operations + (addition), ρ· (scaling) on probabilistic states (which are
functions to [0, 1]) are the addition and scaling of functions. The operation ⊕ρ
(probabilistic choice) combines these two: θ ⊕ρ θ′ = ρ · θ + (1 − ρ) · θ′. Finally
the operation c? (conditional choice) removes the probability for states which do
not satisfy c: if θ = ρ1 · σ1 + ρ2 · σ2 + . . . and c is true in σ1, σ3 but not in σ2,
etc. then c?θ = ρ1 · σ1 + ρ3 · σ3 + . . .
Deterministic and probabilistic predicates Deterministic predicates dp ∈ DPred
are first order predicate logical formulas, i.e.
dp ::=true |false |b | e ≤ e | dp ∧ dp | dp ∨ dp | ¬ dp | dp→ dp | ∃i :dp | ∀i :dp
Note that the conditions (boolean expression) are also deterministic predicates.
With interpretation, e.g. I, to give the value of the variables we can check if a
predicate is satisfied, denoted I |=d dp. If we have a distribution instead of the
value of (some) variables, e.g. in a probabilistic state, we get a probability that
the predicate holds. We use P(dp) to denote this probability and around it build
a new type of expressions, the probabilistic expressions (er), with range [0, 1]:
er ::= ρ | r | P(dp) | er + er | er − er | er ∗ er | er/er | f(e, . . . , e)
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A probabilistic state provides the distribution of the program variables with
which we evaluate P(dp). For logical variables such as r we still have a standard
interpretation which simply provides the value.
Example 1. The expression r + P(x > 2) has value 34 for interpretation I with
I(r) = 14 and state
1
4 · [x = 1] + 14 · [x = 2] + 14 · [x = 3] + 14 · [x = 4].
1
2 · x is not a valid expression as program variables are allowed only within
in the P(·) construct.
Probabilistic predicates p, q ∈ Pred are basically first order predicate for-
mulas and the combination of such predicates using (logical and arithmetical)
operators:
p ::= true | false | b | e ≤ e | p ∧ p | p ∨ p | ¬p | p→ p | ∃j : p | ∀j : p
| ρ · p | p+ p | p⊕ρ p | c?p
with the restriction that the arithmetical operations (ρ·,+,⊕ρ, c?) do not occur
negatively, i.e. in ¬p or p → q the predicate p may not contain arithmetical
operations. Note that the type of the expression e can be any of the types
introduced, including the probabilistic expressions.
Example 2. A common basic predicate P(x = 1) = r states that probability of
a the deterministic predicate, in this case x = 1 holding is equal to r.
The predicate ∀i, j : P(x = i ∧ y = j) = P(x = i) · P(y = j) states that x and
y are independent.
Given a probabilistic state and an interpretation of the logical variables we
can check if the state satisfies a predicate, (θ, I) |= p, or simply θ |= p, again omit-
ting the interpretation I from the notation. The interpretation of comparison of
expressions and the logic operators are standard. The arithmetical operators are
the logical counterparts of the same operations on states. We have:
θ |= ρ · p when there exists θ′: θ = ρ · θ′, θ |= p
θ |= p+ p′ when there exists θ1, θ2: θ = θ1 + θ2, θ1 |= p and θ2 |= p′
θ |= p⊕ρ p′ when there exists θ1, θ2: θ = θ1 ⊕ρ θ2, θ1 |= p and θ2 |= p′
θ |= c?p when there exists θ′: θ = c?θ′, θ |= p
Note that if a predicate does not use the P(·) function nor the arithmetical
operators, we do not need the probabilistic state to check if the predicate is
satisfied (only the interpretation of the logical variables is needed). We call such
predicates P-free.
Example 3. The predicate (P(x = 1) = 14 ) + (P(x > 2) = r) is true in state
1
4 · [x = 1] + 14 · [x = 2] + 14 · [x = 3] + 14 · [x = 4] with interpretation I, I(r) = 34 ,
because we can split the state into 14 · [x = 1], which satisfies P(x = 1) = 14 , and
1
4 · [x = 2] + 14 · [x = 3] + 14 · [x = 4] which satisfies P(x> 2) = r.
Predicate (P(x = 1) = 14 ) + (P(x< 3) = r) is false in this state and I; there
is no way of splitting the state in such a way that parts satisfy both predicates.
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3 A probabilistic Hoare style logic.
In this section we briefly introduce the probabilistic Hoare style logic. See [10,
9, 5] for details.
Hoare triples, also known as program correctness triples, give a precondition
and a postcondition for a program. A triple is called valid, denoted |= { p } s { q } ,
if the precondition guarantees the postcondition after execution of the program.
Our derivation system for Hoare triples adapts and extends the existing Hoare
logic calculus. The rules for skip, assignment, sequential composition, precondi-
tion strengthening and postcondition weakening and procedure calls are stan-
dard. The rule for conditional choice is adjusted and a new rule for probabilistic
choice is added, along with some structural rules. We only present the main
rules here (see e.g. [9] for a complete overview), noting that the other rules come
directly from Hoare logic or from natural deduction.
{ p[x/e] } x := e { p } (Assign)
{ c?p } s { q } {¬c?p } s′ { q′ }
{ p } if c then s else s′ fi { q + q′ }
(If)
{ p } s { p′ } { p′ } s′ { q }
{ p } s ; s′ { q }
(Seq)
{ p } s { q } { p } s′ { q′ }
{ p } s⊕ρ s′ { q ⊕ρ q′ }
(Prob)
{ p } s { q } { p } s { q′ }
{ p } s { q ∧ q′ }
(And)
p′ ⇒ p { p } s { q } q ⇒ q′
{ p′ } s { q′ }
(Cons)
{p} BD {q}
{p[e1,...,en,x1,...,xn / v1,...,vn,w1,...,wm ]} D(e1, . . . , en; x1, . . . , xn) {q[x1,...,xn / w1,...,wm ]}
Note the use of the implication operation ⇒ in the (Cons) rule. This operation
is formally defined in the next section which also discusses the axiomatization of
this opertion. After treating reasoning about (implication between) probabilistic
predicates in the next section we apply the Hoare rules in the example derivation
in section 5.
4 A calculus for probabilistic predicates.
The important ‘rule of consequence’ (Cons) in the Hoare style logic allows
strengthening of the precondition and weakening of the postcondition. To apply
this rule we need to determine which implications are valid. In this section we
provide results allowing reasoning about equivalence of predicates and the im-
plication between predicates. These results consist of a conservative extension
result, allowing the use of standard first order reasoning methods, a congru-
ence result allowing equational reasoning and a list of equivalences capturing
the arithmetical operators, usable as axioms in the equational reasoning.
The key relation in our ‘calculus’ is equivalence ≡ of predicates.
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Definition 4. We write p ⇒ p′ if ∀θ, I : (θ, I) |= p → (θ, I) |= p′ and p ≡ p′ if
p⇒ p′ and p′ ⇒ p.
We first present the congruence results for ⇒.
Lemma 5 (Congruence). If p ⇒ p′ then op p ⇒ op p′ for op ∈ {∃,∀, ρ·, c? }
and ¬ p′ ⇒ ¬ p.
If p ⇒ p′ and q ⇒ q′ then p op q ⇒ p′ op q′ for op ∈ {∧,∨,+,⊕ρ } and
p′ → q ⇒ p→ q′.
As a direct consequence we also have that ≡ is a congruence for all operators.
For · we also have the reverse, i.e.
if ρ · p⇒ ρ · p′ then p⇒ p′.
4.1 Non-probabilistic reasoning
The interpretation of the logical constructions is standard. If we consider the
probabilistic and arithmetical constructions to be ‘black boxes’ we can do clas-
sical reasoning. To be more precise, for a fixed state θ the construct P() is just
another function symbol in the probabilistic (i.e. real valued) expressions. When
reasoning non-probabilistically we ignore the state θ. Thus the exact function
represented by P() is not known, only that it is some function to [0, 1]. Similarly
any arithmetical construct, e.g. p+q, can be seen as a black box, i.e. an unknown
function which describes a boolean.
Definition 6. We use dp() to denote the context in which the logical variables
i1, . . . , in occurring in dp have been replaced by open places (denoted unionsq1, . . . ,unionsqn)
and dp(j1, . . . , jn) for the predicate obtained by substituting j1, . . . , jn in the open
places. We introduce a fresh n-ary function symbol rdp() to denote an unknown
function to [0, 1]. Similarly, p() denotes the context obtained from p and bp() a
fresh boolean function symbol.
Using the function symbols above we define ‘black box interpretations’ for
expressions and probabilistic predicates. We obtain expression BB(e) from ex-
pression e by replacing each occurence of P(dp) by the corresponding function
rdp(i1, . . . , in). A black box interpretation BB(p) of a probabilistic predicate p is
a deterministic predicate satisfying:
BB(p) = bp() or
BB(p) = p for p P-free, or
BB(p) = BB(e) ≤ BB(e′) for p = e ≤ e′, or
BB(p) = BB(q) opBB(q′) for p = q op q′, op ∈ {∧,∨,→ }, or
BB(p) = opBB(q) for p = op q, op ∈ {∀i,∃i,¬}
Lemma 7. If I |=d BB(p) then for any θ we have (I, θ) |= p.
If |=d BB(p)→ BB(q) then p⇒ q.
If |=d BB(p)↔ BB(q) then p ≡ q.
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The intuition behind this result is as follows: The validity of BB(p) is obtained
irrespective of the value given by the functions rdp() and bp(). By fixing θ we
only select one possible function for which the predicate is true.
Example 8. (i) i = j ⇒ P(x = i) = P(x = j) can be derived by noting:
BB(P(x = i) = P(x = j)) = (fx=unionsq(i) = fx=unionsq(j)) and |=d (i = j)→ (fx=unionsq(i) =
fx=unionsq(j)).
(ii) p + q ∧ p + q ≡ p + q can be derived by noting: BB(p + q ∧ p + q) =
BB(p+ q) ∧BB(p+ q) = fp+q() ∧ fp+q() and |=d fp+q() ∧ fp+q() ↔ fp+q().
(iii) We cannot derive (p ∧ p) + q ≡ p + q directly using lemma 7 as we
cannot ‘look into’ the black box (p ∧ p) + q. However, we can first note that
p ∧ p ≡ p and then apply the congruence result.
Thus the non-probabilistic part of the reasoning is standard. We assume the
reader is familiar with ways of formalizing such reasoning and we will be less
precise in this part of the reasoning.
4.2 The axioms
The main remaining question is how to deal with the arithmetical operators.
For each operators we provide a list of valid equivalences that can be used as an
axiomatic basis of equational reasoning with these predicates. These equivalences
consist of a list of basic properties and a list of distributivity laws for each
of the operators. We do not treat the operator ⊕ρ as p ⊕ρ p′ is equivalent to
ρ · p+ (1− ρ) · p′.
In the axioms we will want to state things about validity of deterministic
predicates (e.g. dp → dp′). However, deterministic predicate may contain pro-
gram variables, while probabilistic predicates may not. In this case by validity
we mean that the deterministic predicate must hold, no matter which value the
program variables have. We introduce the new notation 2(dp) capturing this
notion of validity.
Definition 9. Let x1, . . . xn be the program variables occurring in dp and let
j1, . . . jn be fresh logical variables (i.e. not occurring in dp). Then
2(dp) ::= ∀j1, . . . jn : dp[j1/x1, . . . jm/xm]
Note that 2(dp) is a P-free predicate which holds exactly when dp is fulfilled by
every deterministic state σ, i.e. (θ, I) |= 2(dp) iff ∀σ : (σ, I) |=d dp.
Below we present the axioms and explain the main characterization and some
of the difficulties with distributivity.
Probabilistic axioms The following axioms capture basic properties of prob-
abilistic states.
P(false) = 0 ≡ true (A1)
P(true) ≤ 1 ≡ true (A2)
P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp) + P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′) ≡ true (A3)
2(dp→ dp′)⇒ P(dp) ≤ P(dp′) (A4)
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The first three axioms state that the given equations on chances are tautolo-
gies. These properties are directly derived from properties of (sub-)probability
measures. Recall that incomplete states (e.g. caused by non-termination) may
satisfy P(true) < 1. The last axiom lifts reasoning on deterministic predicates
to probabilistic predicates: If dp→ dp′ must hold then the probability P(dp) of
dp cannot be more than the probability P(dp′) of dp′. (Note that any axiom of
the form p ⇒ q could be equivalently written as p ≡ p ∧ q thus still fits within
the equational system.)
Example 10. (i) We obtain
2(dp↔ dp′) ⇒ P(dp) = P(dp′)
directly from A4.
(ii) We have
P(dp) = P(true)− P(¬dp) ≡ true
In the derivation we streamline the notation slightly, writing er1 = er2 = . . . =
ern rather than true ≡ (er1 = er2) ≡ . . . ≡ (er1 = er2) ∧ . . . ∧ (ern−1 =
ern) ≡ (er1 = ern). Using this notation gives
P(dp′) [A3] = P(dp ∧ ¬dp′) + P(dp ∨ ¬dp)− P(¬dp)
[ex. 10(i)] = P(false) + P(true)− P(¬dp)
[A1] = 0 + P(true)− P(¬dp)
= P(true)− P(¬dp)
We will see the use of the expression ‘P(true)’ return in rules below. This ex-
pression captures the total probability of the probabilistic state. As noted above
this total probability may be less than 1.
Axioms for · The following two sets of axioms capture the behaviour of the
· operator. We first present the basic axioms for the · operator after which we
provide distributivity laws.
ρ · (P(dp) = r) ≡ P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ (A5)
ρ · (ρ′ · p) ≡ (ρ · ρ′) · p (A6)
ρ · p ≡ p ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ if p is P-free (A7)
The axiom A5 characterizes the · operator: The probability of all events is scaled.
Clearly the probability of the event dp becomes ρ · r but also the probability of
other events is scaled, which is expressed by P(true) ≤ ρ; no event can have a
probability greater than ρ · 1 after scaling.
The second axiom states that first scaling with ρ′ and then with ρ is the
same as scaling directly with ρ · ρ′.
As a P-free predicate does not depend on the probabilistic state, it is not
influenced by scaling of this state. The scaling only affects the total probability
(P(true)) that the state can have; after scaling it can be at most ρ.
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Example 11. (i) We have commutativity for ·:
ρ · (ρ′ · p) [A6] ≡ (ρ · ρ′) · p
≡ (ρ′ · ρ) · p
[A6] ≡ ρ′ · (ρ · p)
(ii) The operation · influences the state but not the logical variables:
1
2 · (P(x = 1) = 12 )⇒ P(x = 1) = 14
1
2 · (r = 12 )⇒ r = 12
1
2 · (P(x = 1) = r ∧ r = 12 )⇒ P(x = 1) = 12r ∧ r = 12
⇒ P(x = 1) = 14
The next set of axioms capture the interplay between · and the other opera-
tors in a number of distributivity laws. The operator · distributes over the other
operators in a straightforward manner. Only for + there is a complication which
is explained below the rules.
ρ · (p op p′) ≡ (ρ · p) op (ρ · p′) (A8)
ρ · (op’ p) ≡ op’(ρ · p′) (A9)
ρ · (p+ q) ≡ ∃r : ρ · (p ∧ P(true) ≤ r) + ρ · (q ∧ P(true) ≤ 1− r) (A10)
with op ∈ {∧,∨,⊕ρ′}, op’ ∈ {∃i :,∀i :, ρ′·, c?} and r a fresh variable not occurring
in p or q. (Note that the case op’ = ρ′· expresses commutativity of · which has
already been derived in example 11(i).)
The scaling operator · distributes straightforwardly over all other operators
except + for which there is a complication: If θ satisfies p and θ′ satisfies p′ and
θ + θ′ exists (is a probabilistic state) then this state satisfies p + p′. However,
the combination θ + θ′ may not exist because it would have a total probability
greater than 1. In this case first adding and then scaling, as in e.g. 12 · (p + q)
is not possible, however, if the states are first scaled then they can be added, as
in 12 · p+ 12 · q, without exceeding a total probability of 1. Axiom A10 captures
that ρ · (p + q) is the same as ρ · p + ρ · q as long as the total probability
of 1 is not exceeded. Note that as a direct consequence of this rule we have
ρ · (p+ q) ⇒ ρ · p+ ρ · q.
Axioms for ? In giving the characterization of the ? operator we have the
complication that part of the state has been removed. The probability of events
will depend on the part of the state that has been removed.
c?(P(dp) = r) ≡ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧
0 ≤ rδ ≤ 1− P(true) ∧2(dp→ c)→ rδ = 0 (A11)
c?(c′?p) ≡ (c ∧ c′)?p (A12)
c?p ≡ p ∧ P(¬c) = 0 if p is P-free (A13)
true?p ≡ p (A14)
2(c↔ c′) ∧ c?p⇒ c′?p (A15)
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After removing the part of the state where c does not hold, the chance of ¬c
must be 0. By removing this part of the state the probability that dp holds is
also decreased by some amount, say rδ. Clearly rδ is at least 0 and at most
1 − P(true) which is the total amount of probability that is missing from the
state. In the special case that dp logically implies c the probability of dp cannot
be decreased by removing states not satisfying c so rδ must be 0. (Also, if dp
implies ¬c then all states satisfying dp will be removed giving rδ = r but this is
already implied by the fact that P(¬c) = 0.)
The last two axioms lift reasoning on conditions to reasoning on probabilistic
predicates similar to what axiom A4 did for deterministic predicates.
Example 12. (i) We have commutativity of ?:
c?(c′?p) ≡ (c ∧ c′)?p ≡ (c′ ∧ c)?p ≡ c′?(c?p)
(ii) The total probability of c?p is the probability of c in p.
c?(P(c) = r)⇒ [A11] P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(c) = r − rδ ∧ rδ = 0
⇒ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ P(c) = r
⇒ [A3] P(c ∨ ¬c) = 0 + r + 0
⇒ P(true) = r
(iii) Similarly, if c is implied by dp then the probability of dp will not change
by applying c?.
2(dp→ c) ∧ c?(P(dp) = r)⇒ [A11] ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧ rδ = 0
⇒ P(dp) = r
The next set of axioms provide distributivity laws for ?.
c?(p ∨ q) ≡ (c?p) ∨ (c?q) (A16)
c?(∃i : p) ≡ ∃i : (c?p) (A17)
c?(p+ q) ≡ ∃r : c?(p ∧ P(true) ≤ r) + c?(q ∧ P(true) ≤ 1− r) (A18)
with i not free in c and r a fresh variable not occurring in p or q. With distribu-
tivity over + we have the same complication as for ·; the axiom above capture
that c?(p+ q) is the same as c?p+ c?q as long as the total probability of 1 is not
exceeded. Similar to the case with · we have that c?(p+ q)⇒ c?p+ c?q follows
directly.
The operator ? does not distribute over ∧ (nor over ∀i :), c?(p∧q) 6≡ c?p∧c?q,
as p and q may have conflicting requirements for the part of the state which is
removed by first applying the c? operator We have to suffice with implication
and a special case:
c?(∀i : p)⇒ ∀i : c?p (A19)
c?(p ∧ q)⇒ c?p ∧ c?q (A20)
c?(p ∧ q) ≡ c?p ∧ c?q if p is P-free (A21)
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For a P-free predicate the equivalence does hold as a P-free predicate is not
influenced by the ? operator. Note that by using axiom (A13) we already have:
c?(∀i : p) ≡ (∀i : p)∧P(¬c) = 0 ≡ ∀i : (p∧P(¬c) = 0) ≡ ∀i : (c?p) thus a similar
‘P-free-axiom’ for ∀ is not needed.
Axioms for + The following two sets of axioms capture the behaviour of the
+ operator. We first present the basic axioms for the + operator after which we
provide distributivity laws.
P(dp) = r + P(dp′) = r′ ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r′ ≤ P(dp′) ∧
P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r + r′ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′) (A22)
p+ q ≡ q + p (A23)
(p1 + p2) + p3 ≡ p1 + (p2 + p3) (A24)
p+ p′ ≡ p ∧ (true+ p′) if p is P-free (A25)
The first rule provides a characterization of the + operator: Two partial states
are combined. The probability of an event cannot be less in the combined state
than it already is in one of the two parts. The probability of dp may be higher
than r if it also has a probability of occurring in the right hand side. The proba-
bility of the event dp ∧ dp′ is at most r+r′ because is probability is at most r in
the left hand part and at most r′ in the right hand part. Similarly the probability
of dp ∨ dp′ is at least r+ r′ because its probability is at least r in the left hand
part and at least r′ in the right hand part. The second rule (commutativity) and
third rule (associativity) are straightforward while the last rule allows moving
‘non-probabilistic’ properties to outside the +.
Example 13. Taking dp′ equal to dp in the first rule gives
P(dp) = r + P(dp) = r′
[A22] ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r′ ≤ P(dp) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp) ≤ r + r′ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp)
[A4] ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r′ ≤ P(dp) ∧ P(dp) ≤ r + r′ ≤ P(dp)
[r, r′ ≥ 0] ≡ P(dp) = r + r′
Two parts are added so the probability of a given event is the sum of the prob-
abilities in both parts. (Note that the remark [r, r′ ≥ 0] in the last equivalence
is needed only for the reverse implication.)
Below we provide a set of distributivity laws for +. Recall that we already
have given rules for distributivity of · (axiom A10) and ? (axiom A18) over +.
(p ∨ p′) + q ≡ (p+ q) ∨ (p′ + q) (A26)
(∃i : p) + q ≡ ∃i : (p+ q) i not free in q (A27)
The operator + does not distribute over ∧ and ∀. Similar to the case for ? we
have that (p∧ p′) + q is stronger than (p+ q)∧ (p′ + q). In (p+ q)∧ (p′ + q) the
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state can be split in different ways to satisfy p + q and p′ + q thus there is no
guarantee that there exists a part of the state which satisfies both p and p′. We
have to suffice with implication and a special case.
(∀i : p) + q ⇒ ∀i : (p+ q) if i not free in q (A28)
(p ∧ p′) + q ⇒ (p+ q) ∧ (p′ + q) (A29)
(p ∧ p′) + q ≡ (p+ q) ∧ (p′ + q) if p is P-free (A30)
Again a similar ‘P-free-axiom’ for ∀ is not needed as, using axiom A25 we already
get, for i not free in q: (∀i : p)+q ≡ (∀i : p)∧ (true+q) ≡ ∀i : (p∧ (true+q)) ≡
∀i : (p+ q)
This completes the axiom system. In the next section we illustrate the cal-
culus by axiomatizing a derivation from the verification of ElGamal presented
in [5].
5 Applying the calculus in the El-Gamal proof.
In this section we show how the reasoning rules for the logic can be applied in
the setting of a Hoare-style logic by treating an example presented in [5]. The
proof outline in Table 1 represents the main derivation using the rules of the
probabilistic Hoare style logic. The complete proof of El-Gamal security uses
several transformations to reach the program (game) below. We refer to [5] for
details.
We first recall some short-hand notation and results from [5].
Definition 14. We use I(e, e′) to denote that expressions e and e′ are indepen-
dent:
I(e, e′) ::= ∀i, j : P(e = i ∧ e′ = j) = P(e = i) · P(e′ = j)
We use RS,S′(e, e′) to denote that expressions e, e′ have independent uniform
distributions over their respecitive domains S, S′:
RS,S′(e, e′) ::= ∀i, j : P(e = i ∧ e′ = j) = 1/|S| · 1/|S′|
We assume it is clear how this can be extended to any number of expressions.
As a basic result we have that ‘independent uniform distributed’ variables are
exactly that, indepentent and uniformly distributed. Also we have that if an
expression is independent of the arguments of a function then it is independent
of the outcome.
Lemma 15.
RS,S′(e, e′) ≡ RS(e) ∧RS′(e′) ∧ I(e, e′)
I(e, e′)⇒ I(e, f(e′))
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Below we will illustrate the calculus using a main derivation in [5] which
shows that, after a number of transformations, the security game is similar to a
coin toss. The transformed security game is the program s given by the numbered
lines in Table 1. For this procedure we derive
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)} s {P(x1) = 1/2}
In otherwords, we show that given random inputs the chance of the event x1
which represents correctly guessing which message was encoded (m0 or m1) is
equal to half.
We decribe how to derive the Hoare tripple in Table 1, in bottom up fashion.
In the last line we use rule (Cons). To show implication (I9), we apply the result
of example 13.
Then we apply rule (If). Implication (I8) follows from Axiom (A1). To show
implication (I7), we apply the second result of example 12.
To derive implication (I6) we first note that from the definition of RBool we
get RBool(v5) ⇒ P(v5) = 12 ∧P(¬v5) = 12 ⇒ P(true) = 1. We then check the
probability of v5 = b:
P(v5 = b) = P((v5 ∧ b) ∨ (¬v5 ∧ ¬b)) = P((v5 ∧ b)) + P(¬v5 ∧ ¬b)− 0
[I(v5, b)] = P(v5) · P(b) + P(¬v5) · P(¬b)
[R(v5)] = 12 · P(b) + 12 · P(¬b) = 12 · (P(b) + P(¬b)) = 12 · P(b ∨ ¬b)
= 12 · P(true) = 12 · 1 = 12
As the next step we use rule (Assign). Implication (I5) follows from Lemma 15.
For implication (I4) we use note that (using shorthand ρ = 1/(q3 ·r ·2)) we have
(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)
[A11]⇒ P(v5 = true) = 0
[A4]⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = 0
(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)
[Def. R]⇒ (v5)?(P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = ρ)
[ex. 12(iii)]⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = ρ
Combining these two facts by using the congruence lemma for + and then ap-
plying the result in example 13 gives
p1 + p2 ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = 0 + ρ = ρ
Symmetrically we also get
p1 + p2 ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = false) = ρ+ 0 = ρ
Thus
p1 + p2 ⇒ ∀i5 : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
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{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)}
(I1)⇒ (A)
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · A0(v1, v4), v4, v5)
∧RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · A1(v1, v4), v4, v5)}
m0 := A0(v1,v4); (1)
m1 := A1(v1,v4); (2)
p0
4
= {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m0, v4, v5)
∧RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m1, v4, v5)}
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)}
if v5 = false then (3)
{(¬v5)?p0} (I2)⇒ {(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m0, v4, v5)}
tmp := v3 · m0 (3a)
p1
4
= {(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
else
{(v5)?p0} (I3)⇒ {(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m1, v4, v5)}
tmp := v3 · m1 (3b)
p2
4
= {(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
fi
{p1 + p2} (I4)⇒ {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
(I5)⇒
{RBool(v5) ∧ I(v5, A2(v1, v2, tmp, v4))}
b := A2(v1,v2, tmp,v4) (4)
{RBool(v5) ∧ I(v5, b)} (I6)⇒ {P(v5 = b) = 1/2}
if v5 = b then (5)
{(v5 = b)?(P(v5 = b) = 1/2)} (I7)⇒ {P(true) = 1/2}
x1 := true (5a)
{P(x1) = 1/2}
else
{(v5 6= b)?(P(v5 = b) = 1/2)} (I8)⇒ {P(false) = 0}
x1 := false (5b)
{P(x1) = 0}
fi
{(P(x1) = 1/2) + (P(x1) = 0)} (I9)⇒
{P(x1) = 1/2} (B)
Table 1. Derivation of {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)} s {P(x1) = 1/2}
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Forall introduction for the free variables i1, i2, i3, i4 gives us implication (I4).
The following steps are straightforward from rules (If) and (Assign). Impli-
cations (I2) and (I3) are trivial.
Finally for implication (I1) we use the assumption that multiplication · has
an inverse in the group. We use this assumption in the form of the following two
properties:
∀k, l : ∃m : k ·m = l (Mul I)
∀k, l,m : (k ·m = l ·m) → k = l (Mul II)
Using these assumptions we derive implication (I1) as follows (again using ρ as
a shorthand for 1/(q3 · r · 2))
RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
⇒ ∀j : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[Mul I]⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : j · f(i1, i4) = i3 ∧
P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[Mul II]⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : 2(v3 = j ↔ v3 · f(i1, i4) = i3) ∧
P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[ex.10(i)]⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 · f(i1, i4) = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
⇒ ∀i3 : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 · f(v1, v4) = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
⇒ RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · f(v1, v4), v4, v5)
6 Conclusions and Future work
In this paper we take a important step toward mechanizing the proofs in the
methodology introduced in [5] by providing a calculus for reasoning about the
validity of implication between probabilistic predicates. The usefullness of the
calculus from this perspective is illustrated by showing how it can be used to
replace the partly semantical reasoning of [5] in the main Hoare style derivation
for the ElGamal correctness proof. The main ingredients of the calculus are the
preservation of classical logical reasoning, a congruence result and a list of axioms
capturing the basic behaviour and distributivity properties of the arithmetical
operators which are specific to the probalistic Hoare logic.
The next step in the mechanization would be the implementation of prob-
abilistic predicates in a theorem proving system, such as PVS, HOL, etc. We
envision a three possible levels of abstraction: The first, most abstract, level
is an implementation of the calculus; There is no notion of probabilistic state
and the reasoning consist purely of syntactical manipulations, application of the
calculus rules and use of the proofcheckers built in mechanisms for reasoning
about deterministic predicates. The second level introduces probabilistic states
in terms of abstract functions and the probabilistic properties of these functions
as axioms. This allows modeling the semantics of predicates and deriving results
directly from the probabilistic properties. At this level of abstraction one can
16 Jerry den Hartog
also reason about and derive correctness of the calculus rules themselves. The
final level defines probabilistic states as countable sums and uses arithmatical
properties of such sums to derive results. In this way we can derive results di-
rectly from properties of the data types (such as real numbers). Ofcouse, one can
mix the levels as needed; e.g. results in a lower level can be added as axioms in
a higher level. In this way we can justify results based on elemental properties
while still reasoning about program at a high level of abstraction.
In addition to the implementation of probabilisitc predicates in a proofchecker
there is the step to Hoare logic proof outlines. Checking correct application of
the Hoare logic rules can be implemented in the proof checker or could be done
by a pre-processor which does syntactic checks and outputs proof obligations in
the form of implications to be checked in your favorite (probabilistic predicate
enabled) proof checker.
We have not addressed theoretical aspects such as completeness or the ability
to automatically derive proofs. In the target application area we typically already
have the proofs but need an intuitive way of formally expressing the properties
and proofs and check them for oversights. Thus we focus on expressiveness and
minimizing the step from existing proof to formalization. The framework [12]
provides a well developed quantitative weakest precondition approach which al-
lows calculating expectations. However, translating existing proofs to this setting
seems to require more adaption and/or the use of meta-logical statements in the
formulation of the cryptographic properties and algorithms. Note that with rea-
sonable restrictions it is also possible to define weakest preconditions and obtain
a complete reasoning system in the probabilistic Hoare logic setting [4] though
the size of these predicates may quickly become unmanageable for our purpose.
Besides mechanization of the existing framework we aim at extending the
techniques to different classes of cryptographic algorithms and different types of
security properties. Finally, for further discussion of related work, especially in
the area of verification of cryptographic protocols we refer to [5].
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A Soundness of the Axioms
In this section we illustrate how the soundness of the axioms can be derived by
showing the proofs for some of the key axioms. We treat a basic probabilistic
axioms and the characterizations of the different operators. First we fix some
notation:
Definition 16. We use f [S] to denote the sum of f over all elements specified
by S:
– For f a function to the reals and S a f-countable1 subset of its domain:
f [S] :=
∑
s∈S f(s)
– For a probabilistic state θ and a deterministic predicate dp we define
θ[dp] := θ[{σ | σ |= dp }]
– For the special case dp = true we write |θ|, called the probability mass of θ:
|θ| := θ[true]
To show correctness of axiom A3 we first note that f [S ∪ S′] = f [S] + f [S′] −
f [S ∩ S′]. Using this fact we get:
(A3) P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp) + P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′) ≡ true
Proof. ⇒ Clear.
⇐ If θ |= true then
θ[dp ∨ dp′] = θ[{σ | σ |= dp } ∪ {σ | σ |= dp′ }]
= θ[{σ | σ |= dp }] + θ[{σ | σ |= dp′ }]
− θ[{σ | σ |= dp } ∩ {σ | σ |= dp′ }]
= θ[dp] + θ[dp′]− θ[dp ∧ dp′]
thus θ |= P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp) + P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′).
1 i.e. f is non-zero on at most countably many elements of S
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To show correctness of axiom A5 we first note that ρ · (θ[S]) = (ρ · θ)[S] and ρ · θ
is a state if ρ · |θ| ≤ 1. Using these facts we get:
(A5) ρ · (P(dp) = r) ≡ P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ
Proof. ⇒ If θ |= ρ · (P(dp) = r) then θ = ρ · θ′, θ′ |= P(dp) = r for some θ′ ∈ Θ.
Thus θ[dp] = ρ · θ′[dp] = ρ · I(r) and θ[true] = θ[S] = ρ · θ′[S] ≤ ρ · 1 = ρ.
Thus θ |= P(dp) = ρ · r and θ |= P(true) ≤ ρ.
⇐ If θ |= P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ then |θ| ≤ ρ thus θ′ := 1ρ · θ is a state in
Θ.
We have θ = ρ · θ′ and θ′ |= P(dp) = r. Thus θ |= ρ · (P(dp) = r).
To show correctness of axiom A11 we first note that θ = c?θ + ¬c?θ. Using this
fact we get:
(A11) c?(P(dp) = r) ≡ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧ 0 ≤ rδ ≤
1− P(true) ∧2(dp→ c)→ rδ = 0
Proof. ⇒ If θ |= c?(P(dp) = r) then θ = c?θ′, θ′ |= P(dp) = r for some θ′ ∈ Θ.
Thus θ[¬c] = c?θ′[¬c] = 0 as c?θ′(σ) = 0 when σ 6|= c. Put θ′′ := ¬c?θ′ then θ′ =
θ + θ′′, i.e. θ = θ′ − θ′′. Also, put I(rδ) := θ′′[dp] then θ[dp] = θ′[dp]− θ′′[dp] =
I(r)− I(rδ) and I(rδ) ≥ 0 and I(rδ) = θ′′[dp] ≤ θ′′[S] = θ′[S]− θ[S] ≤ 1− θ[S].
Finaly, if 2(dp→ c) then I(rδ) = θ′′[dp] ≤ θ′′[c] = 0.
⇐ If θ |= P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r− rδ ∧ 0 ≤ rδ ≤ 1− P(true) ∧ 2(dp →
c)→ rδ = 0 then θ = c?θ as θ′[¬c] = 0.
If 2(dp→ c) then put θ′ := θ. We have θ = c?θ′ and θ′[dp] = I(r)− I(rδ) =
I(r)− 0 = I(r). Thus θ = c?θ′, θ′ |= P(dp) = r.
Otherwise there exists σ : σ |= dp, σ 6|= c. Put θ′ := θ+I(rδ) ·σ then c?θ′ = θ
and θ′[dp] = θ[dp] + I(rδ) = (I(r)− I(rδ)) + I(rδ) = I(r). Thus again θ = c?θ′,
θ′ |= P(dp) = r.
Finally, to show correctness of axiom A22 we let the operation ? work on de-
terministic predicates and states rather than only on conditions and states: We
have dp?θ(σ) equals θ(σ) if σ |= dp and 0 otherwise. Using this notation we get:
(A22) P(dp) = r + P(dp′) = r’ ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r’ ≤ P(dp′) ∧ P(dp ∧
dp′) ≤ r+ r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′)
Proof. ⇒ If θ |= P(dp) = r + P(dp′) = r’ then θ = θ1 + θ2, θ1 |= P(dp) = r,
θ2 |= P(dp) = r’ for some θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ.
Thus θ[dp] ≥ θ1[dp] = I(r), i.e. θ |= r ≤ P(dp), also θ[dp′] ≥ θ2[dp′] = I(r’),
i.e. θ |= r’ ≤ P(dp′). Finally,
θ[dp ∧ dp′] = θ1[dp ∧ dp′] + θ2[dp ∧ dp′] ≤ θ1[dp] + θ2[dp′]
θ1[dp] + θ2[dp′] ≤ θ1[dp ∨ dp′] + θ2[dp ∨ dp′] = θ[dp ∨ dp′]
thus θ |= P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r+ r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′).
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⇐ If θ |= r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r′ ≤ P(dp′) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r+ r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′) then
we split θ into θ1 + θ2 such that θ1 |= P(dp) = r and θ2 |= P(dp′) = r’. To be
able to do this we divide θ into four part depending on whether dp and/or dp′
are satisfied:
θnn := (¬dp ∧ ¬dp′)?θ θny := (¬dp ∧ dp′)?θ
θyn := (dp ∧ ¬dp′)?θ θyy := (dp ∧ dp′)?θ
Note that the value of P(dp) in θ equals |θyn| + |θyy|. For each of these parts
we determine how much they should contribute to θ1 and θ2. As θnn does not
effect the probability of dp nor that of dp′ it can go anywhere. Below we will
put it in θ1. We call the contribution of the other three sections to θ1 α, β and
γ respectively and the contributions to θ2 α¯, β¯ and γ¯ respectively.
γ := min{ |θyy|, I(r), |θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny|) } γ¯ := |θyy| − γ
β := I(r)− γ β¯ := |θyn| − β
α := |θny| − α¯ α¯ := I(r’)− γ¯
θ1 := θnn + (α/|θny|) · θny θ2 := (α¯/|θny|) · θny + (β¯/|θyn|)
+(β/|θyn|) · θyn + (γ/|θyy|) · θyy ·θyn + (γ¯/|θyy|) · θyy
Note that the coefficient of θny has been chosen to get the contribution to the
mass of θ1 equal to α(= | (α/|θny|)·θny |) (and similarly for the other coefficients).
As θ1 + θ2 must equal θ we have that α + α¯ = |θny|, and similarly for β
and γ. Also, because the probability of dp should be I(r) in θ1 we have that
β + γ = I(r) (as θnn and θny do not contribute to the probability of dp) and
similarly, because θ2 should give probability I(r′) to dp′ we have α¯+ γ¯ = I(r′).
Looking at these restrictions we see that fixing γ fixes all parameters. Above we
have chosen to make γ as large as possible. There are three factors restricting
the choice of γ: (1) We cannot put more than there is (γ ≤ |θyy|). (2) The value
of P(dp) must not exceed I(r), so certainly γ ≤ I(r), (3) The value of P(dp′)
must be I(r′) in θ2. As this probability can only come from θyn and θyy we need
that γ¯ is at least I(r′)− |θyn|, i.e. γ ≤ |θyy| − (I(r′)− |θny|).
To show that θ1 and θ2 are well defined states it is sufficient to show that
γ, γ¯, β, β¯, α and α are not negative.
– (γ ≥ 0) Clearly |θyy| ≥ 0 and I(r) ≥ 0. Also, as θ |= P(dp′) ≥ r′, I(r′) ≤
θ[dp′] = |θny|+ |θyy|, thus |θyy| − (I(r′)− |θny|) ≥ 0.
– (γ¯ ≥ 0) As γ ≤ |θyy| we have γ¯ ≥ 0.
– (β ≥ 0) As γ ≤ I(r) we have I(r)− γ ≥ 0.
– (β¯ ≥ 0) We have β¯ = |θyn|−I(r)+γ. If γ = |θyy| then β¯ = |θyn|+|θyy|−I(r) ≥
0 as P(dp) ≥ r. If γ = I(r), then β¯ = |θyn| ≥ 0. If γ = |θyy| − (I(r′)− |θny|)
then β¯ = |θyn|+ |θyy|+ |θny| − (I(r) + I(r′)) ≥ 0 as P(dp ∨ dp′) ≥ r + r′.
– (α ≥ 0) We have α = |θny| − (I(r′)− (|θyy| − γ)) ≥ |θny| − (I(r′)− (|θyy| −
(|θyy| − (I(r′)− |θny)))) = 0.
– (α¯ ≥ 0) We have α¯ = I(r′) − |θyy| + γ. If γ = |θyy| then α¯ = I(r′) ≥ 0.
If γ = I(r) then α¯ = I(r′) + I(r) − |θyy| > 0 as r + r′ ≥ P(dp ∧ dp′). If
γ = |θyy| − (I(r′)− |θny|) then α¯ = |θny| ≥ 0.
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By construction θ1+ θ2 = θ and θ1 |= P(dp) = r and θ2 |= P(dp′) = r′. Thus
θ |= P(dp) = r + P(dp′) = r′.
This completes the most involved proofs for the axioms. Correctness of the other
axioms can be shown in a similar or simpler fashion.
